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ii.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appeallate jurisdiction in this
Divorce matter pursuant to Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated,
(1953.

Appellant recites Rules 52(a) and 63(b), Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure as the basis for appeal of Judge Schofield's Order.
Appellee concurs that the rules apply to the subject matter of
Appellant's appeal, but argues that Appellant's arguments do not
warrant overturning Judge Schofield's decision.

1.

SUMMARY OF APPELLEES ARGUMENT
X.
While Gail is not happy with Judge Schofield's findings, he
made reasoned decisions based upon the evidence presented to him by
both parties.

Ronald has

failed

to demonstrate

that Judge

Schofield abused his discretion and rendered a decision that was
prejudicial to him.
II.
The Judge did not violate the Code of Judicial Conduct in
refusing to recuse himself, and in so doing, he avoided further
prejudice to each party, inasmuch as Ronald's Request for Recusal
of Judge Schofield, can only be interpreted as an act of reprisal
against the judge for his earlier order finding Ronald in contempt
of the Court for his refusal to pay Court ordered alimony.

III.
The Court acted within its discretion to impute income to
Ronald

for purposes of determining revised child support and

alimony.
IV.
The Court did not err in refusing to terminate alimony. Judge
Schofield properly evaluated the evidence before the Court and made
a well reasoned decision to modify alimony after weighing the
financial evidence provided by each party, and their respective
needs.
2.
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RONALD'S APPEAL OF JUDGE SCHOFIELD'8 DECISION URGES THE COURT
OF APPEALS TO FIND THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
THAT HIS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WERE INCONSISTENT WITH HIS FINDINGS,
BUT RONALD HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
JUDGE ERRED.
It is clear from the Findings of Fact v " *-ue «-r*^l court that
the disputes between Ronald and Gai
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finally Gail filed her latest Motion for Order to Show

Cause on delinquent clii Id
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his Motion for Modification,, of child support and termination i -

After numerous delays (l I.Iu' 11adr J iu)
reduce

child

SippfFmbei

support

I'll, II

i

and

terminate

alimony

was

convened

Id i ri.tlhl lliiinl I i i eci his attorney 01 i uuae 4, 1995

and proceeded t c. • represent himself pro se.
Each party presented evidence with respect to their employment
suppor t, debts, and « jointly

owned

business.
Ronald argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted the
ml dii"(Hiii' I herefrom, i intenable conclusions.

On

the contrary, Judge Schofield carefully deliberated upon the income

evidence provided by Ronald and he concluded, from these limited
records provided by Ronald, that there appeared to be significant
discrepancies between claimed expenses of Gail and Ronald.

The

judge evidenced considerable thought in deliberating upon this
limited financial evidence submitted by Ronald, to arrive at what
he deemed a fair and equitable solution to the child support
modification issue.
Ronald would urge this Court to accept his self serving
interpretation of his tax statements, which, incidently, were the
only evidence of his income available to the trial court.

He did

not provide the trial court with any documentation or receipts to
support and explain the tax returns.
The trial

court

heard

the testimony

of both parties,

evaluated the available evidence and made an equitable decision
based upon the evidence before it.

Ronald would have this Court

question Judge Schofield's reasoning and urges that the trial court
misread documentary evidence.

Ronald accuses the trial court of

somehow manufacturing a basis for an order of child support and
alimony not otherwise justified.
Utah's position on this very question has been stated and restated in numerous recent cases.

In a landmark case similar to

this, the Supreme Court of Utah held:
An award of alimony, or modification thereof, is within the
sound discretion of the Court, and will not be disturbed
on appeal unless the evidence clearly preponderates against
the findings of the Court, or there has been a misapplication
of the law, or the Court has clearly abused its discretion.
Adams v. Adams,593 P.2d 147 (1979)

4.

In 1988, this Court of Appeals perpetuated the holding in
Smith v, Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (1988), that:
In divorce actions, the trial court has considerable
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests
of the parties Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah ct.
App.1987), and we will not disturb its decision unless it
is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion.
In the case on appeal, the trial court rightfully exercised
its "considerable discretion" in calculating and imputing income to
Ronald upon which a reduction of child support and alimony was then
ordered.
The trial court essentially ruled in Ronald's favor, however
Ronald wanted more.

Just because a party does not get everything

he asks for, is not a basis for the argument that the trial court
was arbitrary and committed reversible error.

This Court should

not reverse the trial court, because there was no abuse of
discretion and the decision of the trial court was clearly just,
not unjust.
II.
The trial court adhered to the Code of Judicial Conduct and
did not violate Rule 63 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, inasmuch
as the trial court fully advised both parties, through counsel, of
a conversation about the case with his daughter, and advised
counsel that he did not believe he needed to recuse himself. Both
counsel agreed that recusal was not warranted, however Ronald,
after being found in contempt of the court for refusal to pay
alimony, fired his attorney, and filed his Request for Recusal in
what appears to be an act of reprisal against the judge.
Judge

Schofield

informed

both

parties,

through

their

respective counsel on April 25, 1995, that he had a conversation
with his daughter about the case pending between Ronald and Gail.
Judge Schof ield proactively revealed the entire conversation to the
5.

parties and advised the parties that he did not believe that the
conversation, or his daughter's employment with R.C. Willey with
one of Gail's daughters# would, in any way, create any bias or
prejudice that would affect his neutrality or objectivity in this
case.

He further gave each party the opportunity to file the

appropriate motion for recusal.

Both attorneys agreed that

recusal was not warranted.
On May 30, 1995, the trial court held Ronald in contempt of
court for failure to pay court ordered interim alimony. Ronald did
not appear at that hearing, but his attorney did. This hearing was
convened after Ronald had filed a Petition to modify the Decree
with respect to alimony and child support, and then filed an
amended petition, and Gail had filed a Motion for Order to Show
Cause alleging nonpayment or underpayment of interim alimony.
On June 5, 1995, Ronald fired his attorney and filed his
Request for Recusal of Judge Schofield.

Ronald accused Judge

Schofield of unconscious bias in favor of Gail.

Ronald does not

describe the bias he alludes to, however one must conclude that
Ronald

was

referring

either

to

Judge

Schofield

granting

a

postponement of the April 26, 1995 trial date, or his holding
Ronald in contempt of Court for failure to pay court ordered
alimony.
Neither
inappropriate.

of

those

actions

by

Judge

Schofield

were

A basis for postponement was presented by counsel

and the judge acted within his discretion to grant counsel's
request. It was the first postponement of the trial. With respect
6.

to the contempt order, it was clear that Ronald had failed to pay
$2,000.00 in alimony, to which he had stipulated in January, 1995.
The judge found him in contempt, ordered him to pay $350.00 for
Gail's attorney fees incurred to bring the Motion and appear at the
Order to Show Cause Hearing, and reserved further sanctions to the
time of trial. Clearly Judge Schofield acted appropriately, and as
any other judge might have, under the circumstances.
Judge Schofield gave both parties a timely notice of his
conversation with his daughter and both parties had an opportunity
to timely request Judge Schofield's recusal. Both parties declined
to take such action. Only after being held in contempt, did Ronald
seek recusal, and the effect

thereof would have been to further

delay resolution of this case, which had already absorbed a great
deal of the time and attention of the court.
Judge Schofield received Ronald's request and considered it in
light of Canon 3.E.(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
states:
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned
including but not limited to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party or a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias
involving an issue in a case, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. ...
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within
third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person: . . .
(iii)is known by the judge to have a more than
de minimis interest that could be substantially
affected by the proceeding.
Clearly, Judge Schofield's Ruling upon Ronald's petition
carefully considered the potential for bias, and he rightfully
7.

concluded there was none. Moreover, he considered the consequences
of Ronald's Petition, if granted, upon the timely resolution of
this oft delayed and convoluted case.

He concluded that his

recusal would be prejudicial to the interests of both parties.
Ronald cites Barnard v. Murohv,882 P.2d, 679 (1994) as the
guideline for recusal and argues that Judge Schofield did not
adhere to that established guideline and therefore his decision
should be reversed.
While the Court in Barnard seems to indicate that once a party
calls into question the trial judge's neutrality, he must either
recuse himself or refer it to another judge, to avoid the potential
for mischief in the event of any actual bias, surely it did not
intend that Rule 63 (b) be spuriously used to cause delay or to
reverse an unfavorable decision.
In this case, Ronald made no effort to have Judge Schofield
recuse himself at the time the judge revealed that he had the
conversation with his daughter, and Judge Schofield did not believe
the conversation was of a nature as to require that he disqualify
himself in accordance with Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Counsel for Ronald did not feel that recusal was warranted at the
time the discussion was revealed by Judge Schofield.

Certainly if

Ronald believed the judge to be biased against him, the time to
seek recusal was at the time the supposed prejudicial communication
took place, not forty-one days later after being held in contempt.
Given the nature of the communication between Judge Schofield
and his daughter, it should be evident that had Judge Schofield
8.

referred this matter to another judge, the Petition would have been
found lacking in merit, and Judge Schofield would have proceeded
with the trial.
If the Judge erred, by not referring Ronald's Petition for
Recusal to another judge for review, the error was harmless, and
the ultimate decision of the trial court would remain the same.
Because Ronald has failed to prove bias on the part of the
trial

court,

and

based

upon

Judge

Schofield's

reasoning

as

manifested in his Findings of Fact, it should be evident that the
decision of the trial court would have been essentially the same,
had Judge Schofield referred this matter to another judge or not.
The Supreme Court of Utah has consistently held with respect
to harmless error as follows:
Supreme Court may reverse trial court judgment only if there
is reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would
have been a result more favorable to the complaining party.
Matter of Estate of Kesler. 702 P.2d 86. (1985)
The Supreme Court arrived at the same conclusion in 1980 when
it held:
Reviewing court does not reverse the judgment merely because
there may have been some error or irregularity; reversal
occurs only if the error or irregularity is such that there is
a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have
been a result more favorable to the complaining party.
Lee v. Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance Service, 606 P.2d 259
(1980).
Moreover, Rule 61 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence,
and no error or defect in any ruling or order in anything done
or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground
for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
9.

every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
III.
The trial court has discretion to determine income for the
purposes of establishing child support obligations.
The trial court was presented with income tax returns by
Ronald as the sole credible evidence of his income, which, he
claimed was less than when he first stipulated to child support.
He had stipulated to pay $533.00 per child per month in child
support in January, 1994, and on August 10, 1994, just seven months
later, he petitioned the court for a significant reduction in child
support, due to his material change in circumstances, to wit: he
had experienced a decline in income.
Judge Schof ield, received the only evidence of income provided
by Ronald, and determined therefrom, that he was, in fact, entitled
to a modification of his child support obligation. Ronald was not,
however, satisfied with the amount of the reduction.

As in the

determination of alimony, the trial court has wide latitude and
discretion

to

establishing

ascertain

child

a

support

party's

income

obligations,

for

purposes

especially

when

of
the

evidence is less than precise as to the party's actual income.
In a 1990 Utah case, similar in some respects to the case upon
appeal, the defendant, on appeal, claimed that the trial court's
findings

of

fact

regarding

alimony

and

child

support

were

unsupported by the evidence and the trial court erred in allocating
the parties' resources.

This Court of Appeals held:
10.

Under Utah Code A n n . Section 30-3-5 (1989), t h e trial court
h a s broad equitable power t o order child support, taking into
account t h e needs of t h e children a n d t h e ability of t h e
parent t o p a y . . . Defendant again claims t h e court erred in
failing t o enter a specific finding regarding defendant's
income. Without such a finding, defendant c l a i m s , t h e court
cannot determine a n appropriate level of child support. W e
disagree. T h e trial court considered t h e evidence and
assessed the credibility of defendant's testimony. Given t h e
evidence, t h e court determined that defendant w a s either
understating his actual income o r had chosen employment which
paid less than h e could otherwise earn.
W E DEFER T O T H E
TRIAL COURT'S ASSESSMENT THAT DEFENDANT H A D A N ABILITY T O
EARN M O R E THAN H E PURPORTED T O EARN A N D FIND N O A B U S E O F
DISCRETION IN T H E COURT'S AWARD O F CHILD SUPPORT IN
ACCORDANCE W I T H THAT ASSESSMENT, (emphasis added) . Oscruthorpe
v. Oscruthorpe, 8 0-4 P. 2d 53 0 (Ut .ahftpp 1 990)
In the case on appealil( t h e trial court made a reasonable

based u p o n t h e evidence provided by Ronald, and this Court should
likewise defer t o that assessment by Judge Schofield.

The trial court has broad discretion in awarding alimony and
w a s n o t bound to enter a n order modifying t h e award of alimony to
the date t h e Petition for Modification w a s filed.
Ronald urges that t h e court erred b y n o t terminating alimony
after finding that Ronald's income h a d mater
UciiiJ ti.icil completed school iiinull h.iiri himitd hull t Line employment. T h e
trial court d i d find that Ronald's income h a d decreased and that
Gail could earn a n income sufficient t o support hersel

o

the lev eJ s* iff i ci ei i It: I: :: p a > her expenses, caused in some measure b y
her reliance o n Ronald t o p a y alimony a s earlier stipulated t o b y
him.

In properly

evaluating the evidence before

it; Ronald's

ability to pay, and Gail's need for some alimony, the judge
exercised its discretion in granting, in part, Ronald's request for
reduction of alimony, and likewise, exercised its discretion in
determining when said reduction would be effective.
As with the award of child support, the Court, in Oscruthorpe
v. Osauthorpe. 804 P.2d 530, (Utah App. 1990). held at page 533:
Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding alimony. Davis
v. Davis, 749 P.2d. 647, 649 (Utah 1988) We will not disturb
the trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court
exercises its discretion within the standards set by the
Court. Id. In determining alimony, the trial court must
consider three factors: 1) the financial conditions and needs
of the receiving spouse; 2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and
3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support.
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
If the trial court considers these factors, this court will
not disturb the alimony award unless such a serious inequity
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
No such abuse of discretion occurred at the trial level.
Judge Schofield clearly considered the financial conditions of both
Ronald and Gail; he evaluated Gail's ability to pay her expenses,
and Ronald's ability to support Gail.

That he imputed income to

Ronald, which Ronald claims he does not have, was clearly within
the trial judge's discretion, and he set forth, in detail, his
reasoning for such imputation of income and there can be no
question that the judge acted fairly and equitably and no serious
inequity has resulted therefrom.
Ronald also argues that the judge misunderstood the law in not
granting relief, retroactive to August 10, 1994 rather than to
January, 1995. He cites Section 30-3-10.6, Utah Code Annotated, as
12.

the authority for making the order modifying alimony retroactive to
August 1 0 .

R P M 11(111! ! nil I'll in in Utah Lode Annotatec

i

/ •

A child or spousal support payment under a child support
order,MAY, b e modified with respect t o A N Y PERIOD DURING
WHICH, a petition for modification is pending (emphasis
added).
*

court

rathei

not required t o modify t h e award of alimony

Jie discretion

retroactive

>eriod
11

judge b e made

during

which
e c i b t 1 111. "I

I'llii'iiI"

did, based upon t h e facts and

t h e petition
Illimi I

Judqe

for

S n l i u ! ni , e,l til

accordance with fairness and

equity.
CONCLUSION
Any error the trial court may have committed, in not complying
with Rule 6 3 ( b ) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, w a s harmless error
iriuisniim,")! lis Rona M l;a;i ic?«i;l i, MI i-. j
bias a n d inequity.

In , I urden of showing obvious

Moreover, Ronald did not make a timely Petition

for recusal and only after Judge Schofield found h i m 111 contempt
MI

Ronald tile such a petition. ..It would b e a n expansion beyond the intent of t h e legislature

and t h e Court " permit the use of Rule 63(b) to thwart the timely
;

,/e as a means of reprisal against

a judge

rendered a n unwelcome finding of contempt.

W i t h respect
1h(."y"

i

* nil In ill

*

arguments proffered b y Appellant,

iasmuch

•

court is afforded

w i d e latitude and discretion t o ascertain income and one's ability
to pay child support and alimony, and s o long

3

the authority for making the order modifying alimony retroactive to
August 10.

Section 30-3-10.6# Utah Code Annotated says:

A child or spousal support payment under a child support
order,MAY, be modified with respect to ANY PERIOD DURING
WHICH, a petition for modification is pending (emphasis
added). . •
The court is not required to modify the award of alimony
retroactive to the date the petition for modification was filed,
but rather it may, in the discretion of the trial judge be made
retroactive

to

any

period

modification is pending.

during

which

the

petition

for

That is precisely what Judge Schofield

did, based upon the facts and in accordance with fairness and
equity.
CONCLUSION
Any error the trial court may have committed, in not complying
with Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was harmless error
inasmuch as Ronald failed to sustain his burden of showing obvious
bias and inequity. Moreover, Ronald did not make a timely Petition
for recusal and only after Judge Schofield found him in contempt
for non-payment of alimony, did Ronald file such a petition.
It would be an expansion beyond the intent of the legislature
and the Court to permit the use of Rule 63(b) to thwart the timely
progress of litigation and to serve as a means of reprisal against
a judge who rendered an unwelcome finding of contempt.
With respect to all other arguments proffered by Appellant,
they are without merit, inasmuch as the trial court is afforded
wide latitude and discretion to ascertain income and one's ability
to pay child support and alimony, and so long as that discretion is
13.

abused so as to render

* patently unfair and

inequitable

resuj.
decision.
Gail elects not to address the issue of contempt which Ronald
has raised upon appeal, as I liiil \i\v in is solel >' Ibel \ ;r»t>n Uona

IcJIII a n ill

Court and does not materially bear upon Gail.
Wherefore, the Appellee, Gail Monks respectfully asks the
Court of Appeals to reject Ronald's appea

eeping

intact the judgment entered by Judge Schofield on January 22nd,
1996.
addition, Gail has been required
respond
ag-i-$100C

tu obtain vt njnse II ILo

Ronald's appeal and therefore she requests an award
Ronald for her attorney fees and costs xn uno amount of
I.

Dated October 11, 1996.

Gregory, Johnson & Barton,
Attorneys for Gail Monks,
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